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Abstract
We start from the fact that the discriminated is almost absent from the theory of
discrimination in economics. Indeed, while the reasons that make one discriminates
another are well established, not much has been said about how the discriminated
will react. Putting together concepts such as psychological consistency and group
identity, we propose a frame that sums up some strategies that a discriminated
can pursue. We end up analysing the conditions under which an individual would
consider to get away from the groups he is assimilated with in order to avoid




In some occasions, people are led to hide part of their identity in order to get better off
in theire life. In those cases, belonging to community seems to be at odd with some other
dimensions of success in life. Young people from the suburbs can let their disctinctive
signs down, and adopt a way of speaking or clothes that would enable them to enjoy
a more enviable economic situation. Similarly, a religious person could be tempted to
hide her faith if she thinks it would help her integrate. So doing, they will try to lower
the discrimination they face. Thus those strategies seem to be perfectly suitable in the
first place, the individual would likely incur a cost in doing so. Otherwise, discrimination
linked to some hidable dimensions wouldn’t hold and stay in the long run. Thus it would
be interesting to investigate what taylors the behavior of the victims of discrimination.
Indeed, a lot has been said about what triggers discrimination. What motivates one to
discriminate may be related to beliefs, tastes, or asymetrical informations(Arrow, 1998;
Becker, 1957, 2010; Phelps, 1972). But not a lot has been written on the effect of dis-
crimination on the behavior of individuals who are victims of discrimination. How should
they react ? Will they do anything to avoid discrimination ? Individuals may try to hide
a part of their identity to avoid suffering a discrimination, or show that they do not de-
serve discriminaton, by working harder, or other strategies. Our point is to bring together
three concepts related to behavioral economics : Discrimination, group identity and sef
consistency. Discrimination denotes the differenciated treatment between people who
belong to different groups. Those groups are tighten by a the sense of a common fate or
the various benefits members can pool from others. This consistutes the second notions,
group identity. This is straighforwardly linked to discriminations : the existence of groups
relies on group identity, and discrimination relies on group membership. Group identity
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is composed of a set of norms, beliefs and other shared by members. As regards to group,
individuals may have multiple memberships, that are either chosen (self-categorisation)
or undergone. This multiple membership implies that under different circumstances, in-
dividuals may reinforce his link to this or this group.
Moreover, we posit that individuals are not inert toward group identity. On the one
hand, due to environemental stimulus, they can choose either to signal their attachment
to the group, or try to pull back from the group. We consider discrimination as a environ-
nemental stimulus, that may impact on how people identify with groups. On the other
hand, since individuals are endowed with personnal identity, and set of norms, they can
also try to influence their social identity to reduce their self-discrepancy. Self-discrepancy
(or cognitive dissonance) springs from the fact that individual are endowed with inner
norms. They would want to match those norms as much as possible but circumstances
can lead them to violate those norms. For exemple, one might accomodate with his inner
norms to be accepted in a group, or to take distance with a prejudiced against group.
This could be made at the expense of a sense of internal consistency. Put differently, we
assume that a trade off can be at work between inner motivation, related with what one
would do had no social strenght influenced his deciscion, and external motivation, due to
those social strenght.
What we want to do is to see how those concepts can articulate in an economic frame-
work, and to which extent it would give an insight on the behavior one can oppose to
discrimination. We will in what follows limit ourselves to identity management issues 1.
1Indeed, one can imagine that an individual faced with discrimination could want to prove his value
by working harder
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We adopt the point of view of an individual, who takes decisions that will affect those
three dimensions. Basically, we will be in a utility maximisation situation, and the point
will be to define the utility function of an individual. This utility will take into account
the discrimination he’ll face throught monetary earnings 2. It will also take into account
the self-psychological comfort the decision leads to, accounting for the distance between
actual choice and some kind of inner reference points. And it will ultimatly take into
account the social identity utility, which derives from the fact of being identified with an
existing group 3.
We aim at analysing the strategies an individual can develop when he’s categorized
with a group that is discriminated against. To illustrate this, we can think of the following
situations4 :
1. An individual is categorized as belonging to a group associated with bad stereotypes.
He doesn’t feel close to that group, and he will act in a way that makes him get away
from the group. He’ll lose the benefits of belonging to the group, but he’ll lower the
risks of discrimination, and be able to act the way he wants, outside of group-stated
norms of actions. He trades off group membership for no discrimination.
2. An individual is categorized to belong to a group, and whatever is inner norms of
actions, and due to the value he assigns to group membership, he’ll behave as to
be accepted in the group, even if he suffers from discrimination.
3. An individual is categorized to belong to a group. He feels strongly close to the
group in terms of norms, but he’ll be willing to act a different way to lift the
2But we can imagine to further integrate the pure psychological cost of being discriminated
3Thus this group might be later made endogeneous
4Those situations will be more accuratly described in the models
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stereotypes that weight on the group, changing the very identity of the group.
That is to say that we aim to identify the circumstances of the trade off between group
membership, psychological consistency, and discrimination. Self-consistency can hurt in-
dividual’s strategies to fight against discrimination, and discrimination can lead to greater
self discrepancy. This will be linked with the strenght of discrimination, against value of
the group, and with the media of self consistency.
The position an individual adopts relative to a social group has been studied in psy-
chology, and notably the conditions under which an individual sticks to a group inspite
of the harms it incurs ; or the conditions under which he’ll fly away from the group. Our
work is close from that, but fits in an individual choice model. Indeed, not much have
been said on the discriminated in economics, and we bet that being discriminated would
lead one to react. Here, the reaction will be in terms of position relative to the group. The
model will account for a identity choice for the individual, which will determine wether
he belongs to a group, and consequently discrimination, accounting for the need for self
consistency. We find that people that are close from the group can adandon it, and that
it is caused by strong discrimination, or relative low value of the group, or low need for
self consistency. We see what follows as a first frame to develop for further theoretical
and ultimatly empirical assessment of the behavior of a discriminated.
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows : first, we will present the
literature we integrate our work in, then we will set a theoretical frame, that we will




As said before, our work will integrate three research streams, discrimination, group
identity, and self-consistency. We believe that they can be brought together fruitfully and
that’s it would bring interesting insights on our question. We now review the literature
related to those streams.
1 Discrimination
In our model, discrimination is a key variable, but our point is not to deeper our under-
standing of discrimination from the discriminator point of view. We consequently refer
to very classical theoretical approaches to discrimination. Becker (1957, 2010) proposes
the first economic analysis of discriminations. For him, individuals have pure preferences
for discrimination against a given type of individuals. In the case of discriminating em-
ployers, they are willing to pay a lower wage to individuals that belong to some groups.
From Becker’s point of view, this need not be a problem : the competition between
employers to hire workers is supposed to ”compete away” discriminations. Firms that
are discriminant won’t be able to sustain a proper hiring policy. The ”a` la becker” dis-
crimination can be refered to as a taste for discrimination. That’s because the manager,
or colleagues, dislikes a kind of person that those persons will be discriminated against.
Phelps (1972) or Arrow (1971) propose a different approach to discrimination, which is
supposed to be rational given available information and given beliefs. It’s called ”statisti-
cal discrimination”. When a principal has to choose an agent among a pool of candidates,
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he tries to assess candidates productivity. To do so, he can refer to group membership
of the candidates, and use the avalaible information about the group rather than about
the individual. Put differently, the information about the group is less costly to gather
and process, so the principal will use it rather than collecting the information about the
individual. This setup doesn’t exclude unfounded discrimination, since the information
about group productivity can rely on subjective stereotypes (beliefs).5 Arrow (1998)
proposes a survey on the ecomic theory about discrimination. In addition to the points
below, he states that discrimination in labour relation can stem from other employees
taste for discrimination, as a particular case of network outcome : discriminating peers
are less willing to work with a type of person that eventually will be either push out of
the job or relativly poorly treated.
The theoretical framework has induced a number of empirical assessments. First, fol-
lowing Oaxaca (1973), econometric work have aimed at identifying and quantifying wage
differences between members of different groups. The idea is to use a variety of control
variables to assess the pure impact on wage of a given group membership, captured by
the coefficient associated to a group membership dummy variable.
Experimental economics has investigated this topic as well. Among very classical lab
experiments, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) propose a test throught different simple games
to assess discriminations. They show a stong prevalence of discrimination, whatever the
game played, that matches the stereotypes in the studied society. This contribution takes
existing groups : the two main jewish groups in Israeli society. Trust, reciprocity, and
5To illustrate this, we can think of sexism : a sexist (man) principal can discriminate women because
he globally assumes them to be less productive.
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altruism are assessed, and shade light on discrimination between those two groups. Dick-
inson and Oaxaca (2009) also tests discrimination in the lab. This time, discrimination
is related to a higher variance of talent distribution in the population. They show that
since principal are risk averse, they discriminate agent from a population with the same
average productivity, but higher variance. This contributions belong to a first stream of
lab experiment on discriminations, which uses existing groups to assess discrimination.
Other contribution, such as Chen and Li (2009) try to figure out the minimal condition
for a group to induce discrimination. The idea is to assess if a group artificially generated
in the lab is sufficient to bring discriminations. They find that, for social preferences,
group membership matters even for induced group, indicating that some discrimination
are acting. Charness et al. (2007) find that, for strategic decisions6, the minimum group
paradigm is not respected, but raising the saliency of the group, by letting other group
member assiste to decision, individuals become discriminating in decisions.Member of the
same group are better treated than others 7. In the same stream, Zizzo (2011) assesses
wether discrimination is favoring ingroup mates, or penalising outgroup individuals. The
idea is to assess how discrimination works, when there is no strategic consideration i.e. no
objective benefit in favoring ingroup / disfavoring outgroups. To do so, different games
are played, such as dictator game, bargaining game, coordination game, ultimatum game.
The outcome is that more than the half of the member of groups discriminate outgroups
in a negative way, which is then assumed to be a main feature of discrimination.
Parralely to the lab experiments, some field experiments on discrimination have been
led. For example, List (2004) assess discriminations in a real-life setting, by hiring people
6i.e. monetary common interests
7For instance, in a coordination game, a individual who is supported by an audience of his group,
playing against a member of the other group, will be more agressive
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to conduct bargaining in a real market for sportcards. Buyers and sellers are recruited.
Sellers are endowed with a common sportcard, for the price to be well-established, and
with a reservation value, to incitate them to bargain. Buyers are endowed with some
money, and have to buy the same card. At the end, authors are able to see that offers to
minorities are univokly disanvantageous.
Behavioral reactions are not as common as the following contribution that explain why
people discriminate. Sanfey et al. (2003) show the neural reaction to unkind treatment
from other, which can be regarded as a reaction to discrimination. In a few word, the
same part of the brain is activated when one have to respond to an unkind proposal in the
dictator game than when experiencing physical disgust (the insula). This is informative
about the emotional reaction of one to some discrimination, but doesn’t say a lot about
how one can actually react in terms of behavior.
Our contribution is to propose a new perspective on discrimination, and consider the
discriminated point of view instead of the discriminator point of view. We believe that
an individual who is subject to discrimination will be led to consider to leave his group,
at the expense of the social identity part of his identity.
2 Identity, group identity and social identity
In most of the literature on discrimination, discrimination arises when an individual
is member of a group that is subject to stereotypes. In the statistical discrimination
literature, one is discriminated because it’s less costly to assess some measure of the
productivity of the group (mean, variance...) that his own productivity. In experimen-
tal literature, even minimal groups (thus group induced in the lab) may be sufficient to
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generate discrimination. That’s why we think the two notions can fruitfully be brought
together. We focus on the notion of social identity, that brings together an idea of group
membership, and identity linked to those groups. Group identity is a composant of an
individual’s identity. This identity linked to the group can be rooting stereotypes about
members characteristics.
A frame-setting paper about social identity is Akerlof and Kranton (2000). The authors
describe how individuals are assigned to social categories, and how those social categories
shape individual’s behavior through an enforcement of a set of norms. Indeed, groups are
defined by norms of behavior, that can range from what to wear to how conciliatory to be
with authority. Thus, individuals who value being integrated in social groups would act
in such a way that they can be accepted in the group. We see the importance of norms
in this literature. If we consider an inert group, norms are to be accepted and interior-
izated by individual in order to be accepted in a group. In a sense, the theory by Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) is issued from Tajfel and Turner (1979) theory of self-categorization :
people self-categorize themselves, and interiorize the norms of the category. They are also
assigned to groups by peers, or outgroup individuals, and a part of their social identity
is partly undergone 8. Mainly, the theory of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is a baseline
intellectual model for most of the literature about social norms in economics.
A complementary stream of contributions is the litterature on social ties. One can
refer toVan Dijk and Van Winden (1997); Van Dijk et al. (2002); Sonnemans et al. (2006).
Social ties refers to a set of links that do not transit essientially through market trades.
Rather, social ties refer to emotional connections between individuals, as well as recipro-
cal services or mutual confidence. Social ties and social identity converge in the sharing of
8One can think about gender or race, as a big undergone part of one’s identity
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common fate by individuals. Social ties arise from interactions between individuals whose
utilities are interrelated, contributing to create a vertuous prosocial slope for behaviors
or a hostile relation rather not likely to encourage collaboration. This depends on what
affects individuals allocate to peers. In some sense, social ties is the chosen part of social
identity, which is at the same time chosen and undergone.
Aside from economics, Ellemers (2012) propose a description of the nature of groups.
Groups not only stem from the addition of human behaviors. They bear independant
selves, the sum of individual behavior does not fully explain it. So groups influence indi-
viduals members, whose behaviors are partly taylored by what the group’s self implies.
Individuals are at each time members of different groups, to which they are categorized
by other and by their own selves (self-categorization). So individuals, depending on both
their emotional attachs, the strenght with wich they are categorized to group, psycho-
logical features, and other contextual contingencies, have their behaviors getting away
from what they would do had they be lonely. This may lead one to think of it as an
effect of the willingness to be member of groups and further, of resulting discrimina-
tions. This may mean that individuals value group membership. This has been shown
as well in neuroscience, for which the loss of group membership or exclusion results in
a pain that can be assimilated to physical pain (Panksepp, 2003; Eisenberger et al., 2003).
Economics then took interest in what motivates individual group membership. For
instance, Heap and Zizzo (2009) show that individuals value groups, by organizing a
market for group membership in the lab. In this market, the price at which group mem-
bership is traded overcomes the material benefits in terms of ”ingroup better treatment”.
This indicates a psychological, non-monetary valuation. Benjamin and Choi (2010) show
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how a social identity can be manipulated in the lab. To do so, they present a utility
function integrating the group identity of an individual, and the strength with which is
linked to this group. The stronger the link, the closer the behavior of group member is
to the group ideal behavior (the norm). The strength is manipulated thanks to saliency
of the group 9. This supports the idea that states that environemental cues may trigger
a switch in one’s proximity to groups.
We also can refer to Horst et al. (2006) for their model of the link between group and
identity, with endogeneous group formation, and identity shifting. They propose a nice
reflexion about the concept of identity. They empashize the fact that, if determining for
individuals, individuals can also try to taylor their own identity. For instance, given their
tastes, they’ll choose to match with a social group, but not only the motivation is to re-
duce self-discrepancy, but also to depict themselves in socially glowing colors. The idea of
a both choosen and undergone identity is present. In this setup, groups are endogeneous
: people choose to join a group for self and social motives, and those groups are modified
by the caracteristics of the new members. They also notice that the self identity may
shift, to account for the change in one’s inner norms or social acquaintances, which could
lead to a shift in the social structure of the society : groups evolve as a consequence of
the evolution of self identities. The model put the light on the intrinsicly versatil nature
of identity, accounting for the multiple nature of identity.
So group identity is a recent topic, and is linked with discrimination in the first place,
9experimentaly, this means that the group ideal is emphasized in the instructions. For instance :
in the treatment, questions were asked to subjects about their ethnic background such as the language
spoken at home, and this was sufficient to triger more savings by subjects of asian descents, consistently
with the assumed norm of behavior of asian american people.
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since group membership and discriminations are the two sides of a same coin. This seems
to feed our intuition that, if possible, one would tinker the strength with which he is
related to a group to moderate the discrimination he faces. But group identity doesn’t
exhaust the identity concerns of individuals. Some other dimensions may explain that one
is not always up to accept to betray one’s peers. We can introduce a more psychological
part of identity, that is linked to psychological consistency and discrepancy.
3 Psychological consistency and discrepancy
The idea of multiple selves, here the social and the inner self, sheltered in one self has
been developed for a long time in psychology. Festinger (1962) or Higgins (1987) have
contributed significantly to the so-called cognitive dissonance theory. If an individual
shelters mutliple selves, those are not necessarly totally consistent. Situations sometimes
favor one self from another, which is likely to imply psychological discomfort. Like other
psychological features of human behaviors, economics has taken interest into that.
Generally, an overview of the investigation of economics into psychology is provided by
Rabin (1998). He emphasizes the fact that economics should integrate psychological di-
mensions of human behavior, such as multiplicity of selves. This has been done so far
in a variety of works, and notably in time-preference related issues. In this context, an
individual’s behavior faced with an intertemporal choice could be considered as a prob-
lem of allocation of a (scarce) ressource accross the successive selves of the same person.
Introducing this subtelty potentially allows to unbury tensions within a person whose suc-
cessive selves do not necessarly share the same preferences over the outcomes of a given
choice. Be´nabou and Tirole (2004) provide an example of those works. For instance, the
decision of smoking is beneficial for the present self of a given person, as far as he likes
16
it, but almost surely detrimental to future self of the same person since it brings health
and addiction issues.
This could extend to social related plurality of selves : If groups impose norms to
their wanna-be members10, individuals have ideals for themselves that need not match
those norms. This could induce a bargaining between the individual self and his social
counterpart. For instance, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) put that individual are not nec-
essarly acting in the narrow sense of their individual self interest. We can interpret that
as the fact that each individual has, just like the group, an ideal norm of behavior, that
he would follow had no social group existed. This refers to some individual self-image,
and sense of duties. Getting away from this norm might introduce psychological harms,
at the same time that the social self can enjoy some social benefits. Hence people might
be divided between this social and individual norms, that need not be totally consistent.
The implicit idea here is that those strenght would taylor one’s behavior, for instance
social consideration would push one into budging with his own aspirations.
For instance, Aguiar et al. (2010) propose a critical review of identity in economics
that can help stretching a bridge between the social and psychological facet of our topic.
The first critics is that identity, as defined by Akerlof and Kranton (2010, 2000) seems
to pool together a large set of different ”non typical” motivations. At the same time, it
refers to social categories one feel associated to, norms of those categories, norms that
one assigns to his own behavior. In this point of view, social identities refers to various
motivations of individual behaviors, that can be contradictory. So doing, this contribu-
tion underlies the ideas that social identity is only a portion of one’s identity that has to
10It may be more correct to talk about assigned members, since there is this issue with categorization
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be complemented by a more psychological, self-centred idea of identity. This is a point
we aim at adding in further developments, the psychological part of motivation will be
thought of as norms that an individual impose to himself, and that have a similar impact
as norm his social categorization yields him. Ellemers et al. (2002) propose a taxonomy
of the situation under which the social component of the identity will dominate, and the
situation under which the self-component of identity will dominate. The idea is that,
depending on circumstances, norms that shape the behavior of an individual will stem
either from the social identity norm, or from the self identity norm.
Our model will also account for those two components of identity, but rather assumes
interplay of those two components rather than alternates resort to either component. In-
deed, if an individual chooses to avoid discrimination by taking some distance to a given
group, he may suffer some discomfort related to the fact that additional to a loss of social
status, he’ll incur a psychological cost because of his inner closeness to the group.
To sum up, we have three dimensions in our problem, that we aim at bringing together.
To some extent, Van Vugt and Hart (2004) in psychology have a similar approach, by
showing how an individual categorized with a group can turn of an external beneficial
offer since he feels commited to the group.
The previous development aimed at showing that part of the behaviors against discrimi-
nation can be thought of in terms of group and psychological dimensions, when faced to
monetary downsides of stereotypes. Putting everything together can help us shade lights




We now develop a simple model that will bring together previous concepts. The general
idea of the model is as follows : we focus on the decision by an individual. This decision
is identity related, thus can be about the way the individual will dress, his reluctance or
taste for authority, and so on. The decision impacts three dimensions of the individual’s
satisfaction : self identity, group membership and identity, and discrimination. Given
this decision, the group will decide wether to accept or reject the individual, based on a
anthromorphic rule. The rule is known by the individual who will take into account the
reaction of the group to his decision. In last instance, a discriminant principal will decide
of the wage he’ll offer to the individual, depending on his group membership.
1 Behavioral hypotheses
1.1 The individual
The individual has a utility function that depends on his raw consumption, his social
utility which is equivalent with being accepted in a group, his self-consistency utility :
V = W (G(X))︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary utility
+ αG(X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
group membership utility
− β|X −X0|︸ ︷︷ ︸
psychological consistency utility
(1)
The individual chooses a action X that we call an ”identity action”. This is reported in
figure 1. It refers to a symbolic action, such as : what to wear, which music to listen
to, what behavior to exhibit toward authority and so on. This action is subject to inner
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norms for the individual, denoted by X0. This is supposed to capture his inner taste,
the one that would arise with no external pressures. Moreover, it would indicate a natu-
ral proximity with the group, who also have norms of behavior that taylor its members
behaviors. Moreover, the |X − X0| term is supposed to capture the distance between
inner taste and the choice that take into account the consequences of his choice on his
social identity and wage. Choosing a X far from X0 is costly, and the higher the β ,
the more costly it is. β represents the need for self consistency. We refer to it as the
self consistency parameter. This is supposed to capture some psychological dimensions
related to the desire to be ”consistent” with own norms. This could be further interprated
in terms of self-confidence, low willingness to be assimilated to a group and so on. α is
the value put on group membership. Like stated in social ties litterature, the value of
group membership is determined by several dimensions. In what follows, we’ll focus on
economic upsides of being member of group. This can be related to services exchanges,
help, monetary support and so on. 11. W is the wage earned, that depends on G(X)
since, as we will see, group membership implies discrimination.
Fundamentally, this functional form for utility stem from works cited in formerly, such
as Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010), or Ellemers (2012). It means that the individual is
embedded in a social context. This social context is here materized by the rattachement
to a group, and the norm of the group. It further means that the presence of the group
with it own norms will inflect individual’s choice as regard to the choice he would have
done had the group not existed. This is related with the point that the group is at the
same time choosen and undergone. Indeed, if discrimination are high as regard as what
11However, one could argue that the other benefits of being part of a group would push the group
membership value in the same direction. That is to say that emotional links would probably reinforce
the economic benefice of group membership
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the group would bring, an individual can act out of the group, but it can be at the ex-
pense of some other dimensions. Conversely, the presence of the group itself can interfer
with one respect of self consistency, if the value brought by the group is big enough to
motivate the individual to undergo self discrepancy.
In first analysis, this functional form for the utility implies a perfect substituability be-
tween the composant of utility. A ”lossy” psychological confort can be overcame by more
money or group belonging 12.
Figure 1: The individual and the group on the identity axis
12This should be discussed, and we should see to what extent this is crucial for results and if an




We consider an anthropomorphic group, that decides either to accept or reject a candidate




0 if Ui¯(X,Xc, ...) > Ui(X,Xc, ...)
1 otherwise
(2)
0 means the group doesn’t accept in the candidate, 1 means it accepts him. Following
Austen-Smith and Roland G. Fryer (2005), we assume that the group has a utility func-
tion, denoted by U(.)13. Once again, this kind of rule indicate that the individual is not
fully free to choose is position toward the group. Ui¯(.) denotes the utility of the group
keeping the individual outside, Ui(.) denotes conversely the utility of the group accepting
the individual. The utility of the group depends on its inner norm; Xc, the choice of the
individual when he is integrated, and some other component that can range from the
monetary welfare of his members to their personnal qualities. Such a decision rule will
allow to account for the reluctance of the group to let its identity vanish. Integrating
individuals that don’t match the norms group will hurt it. It will also depend on taste for
integrating individuals that bear social qualities, i.e. whose behavior in in se enjoyable
for his peers. Other dimensions such as the impact of the individual on the discrimina-
tions the group suffers from will be allowed in this model. The acceptance rule from the
group reflects at the same time wether an individual will be assimilated to the group,
from an external point of view. This means that an individual, by choosing to act in
a very outliying way, can indicate to the world that he shouldn’t be assimilated to the
group. So formulated, it allows integrate in our analysis inflexible groups, race or gender
13To some extent, this rule could be interpretated in a different way, as the opinion of other people,
not necessarly in the group, toward the individual membership in this group
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related for instance. This means that groups are defined by social contengencies rather
than unchanging hard necessities. We’ll later on define some more precise decision rules
for the group.
1.3 The principal
The principal decides to hire an individual for a given wage. This bid wage depends on




(1−D(Xc, Xp))W˜ if G(x) = 1
W˜ otherwise
(3)
Xc denotes the norm chosen by the group. Xp is the inner norm of the principal. The
assumption behind this is that the principal, or the one with whom the individual is con-
tracting, discriminates the member of the group, either for ”a` la becker” reasons or for
”a` la phelps” reasons. In both cases norms trigger the distaste for the collaboration with
an individual, or reinforce beliefs about the people’s low abilities. The discrimination
exists if and only if one is integrated in a group. We can think of it as the fact that, by
integrating the group, an individual reveals some information about himself that triggers
discrimination. Intuitively, the discrimination will increase when the norm of the group
will get further from the norm of the principal.





V (X) =W (G(X)) + αG(X) + β|X0 −X|
given equations (2) and (3)
(4)
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2 Outcome of the model with simple decisions rules
of the group, and a passive principal
In the first place, we discuss the outcomes of the model giving following hypothesis :




O if |X −Xc| > d
1 otherwise
(5)
In this case, following (5), the group has a tolerance as regards to its inner norms. This
tolerance is the area surrounding Xc, no further than distance d from it. The personnal
qualities of the individual are not taken into account, and he has no impact on the norms
of the group. 14
We assume as well a ”passive” principal, that discriminates in the group, and doesn’t
discriminate outside of the group. What is implicit here is that the behavior of one
individual cannot change the identity of the group, and have consequently no impact on




(1−D)W˜ if G(x) = 1
W˜otherwise
(6)
In those circumstances, the individual chooses the identity action that maximizes his
utility, throught wage perceived, group belonging and self-consistency. We propose a
intuitive solution : we compare the utility state inside and outside the group.
14This may be related to the size of the group : if it is somewhat big, it wouldn’t have its identity
changed by accepting an additional member
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The former equation (4) is the general case. We consider only the case where X0 ≤ Xc
but the situation is symmetric with X0 ≥ Xc
15 and the relative position of X and Xc as
no intrinsic value, no moral / welfare weight (this further means that X ≤ Xc ).
To make it easy to compute, we distinguish two different cases :
We’ll define an individual an insider when is inner norm lies within the acceptance
area of the group (⇔ X0 ∈ [Xc − d;Xc]). That’s when an individual feels pretty close
from the group he is related to. Had no discrimination existed, for sure he would have
choosen to be member of the group. This situation is depicted in figure 2.
Conversely, we’ll define an individual an outsider when is inner norm doesn’t lie within
the acceptance area of the group (⇔ X0 /∈ [Xc − d;Xc]). That is, he doesn’t feel that
close to the group, but he is anyway assimilated to it. With no discrimination, he would
not even necessarly be member of the group. It would depend on the relative value of
group and self consistency at his eyes. He nevertheless can accept the group membership
for some reasons, such as a need for social connexions. This case is depicted in figure 3.
An underscript G (resp. G¯) refers to a situation where the individual is in the group
(resp. out of the group). For each type of individual, either insider or outsider :
• For an individual who is not in the group, he’ll choose a X that is as close as possible
of his inner norm provided that he is not in the group.
– For an insider :
VG¯ insider = W˜ − β(Xc − d−X0) (7)
We can’t forget the case where an individual is close to the group but prefers
staying outside to get away from discriminations. In this case, he will choose
15this is true only in this setting
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Figure 2: The insider on the identity axis
the action X that makes him as close as possible to his inner choice, provided
that he is outside of the group. The contraigning nature of social context is
here explicit.
– For an outsider
VG¯ outsider = W˜ (8)
Indeed, if the individual is an outsider, and if he is outside the group, he will
necessarily choose is inner choice. (reducing the ego discrepancy]
• For an individual who is in the group : he will choose the actions that is as close as
possible to his inner action provided that it is in the acceptance area. If his inner
choice is in the acceptance area, he will choose X = X0. If not, he will choose
X = Xc − d
V = (1−D)W˜ + α− β|X −X0| (9)
Equation (9) changes with respect to the fact that the inner choice is in or out of
the acceptance area of the group [Xc − d;Xc] :
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Figure 3: The outsider on the identity axis
– If he is an insider :
VG insider = (1−D)W˜ + α (10)
Indeed, for such an individual, provided that he opts in the group, his optimal
choice is X⋆ = X0. (But as we will see later, an insider needs not opt-in the
group).
– If he is an outsider :
VG outsider = (1−D)W˜ + α+ β(Xc − d−X0) (11)
Indeed, if he’s sure to be accepted as soon as he is in the acceptance area, and
given that is inner choice is outside the acceptance area, he will choose the
action X that’s as close as possible to his inner choice provided that this X is
within the acceptance area : X = Xc − d
We sum up the possible situation in the following table 1: Now, we compute various
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↓ Inner norm ↓ → Choice → X ∈ [Xc − d,Xc] X /∈ [Xc − d,Xc]
X0 ∈ [Xc − d,Xc] Insider, in the group insider, not in the
group
X0 /∈ [Xc − d,Xc] Outsider, in the group Outsider, not in the
group
Table 1: sum-up of the situations possible
equilibrias for our two kinds of individual, insiders and outsiders. The computation will
be intuitive, and to do so we’ll have to add sequentially sets of assumptions that will help
us drawing ”ideal-type cases”.
2.1 The outsider equilibria
We compute intuitively various equilibrias for outsiders, i.e. individuals whose inner
identity is ”not that close to the group identity standard”. (⇔ X0 /∈ [Xc − d,Xc]). To
assess the choice of the individual, we compare (11) and (8).
2.1.1 No discrimination for a normal outsider
First step, we set D = 0. The condition for a normal outsider to be in the group is as
follows
α ≥ β(Xc − d−X0) (12)
Which yields no surprises, and exhibit a trade off between social identity and psychological
consistency.
• the greater is α (i.e. the value of belonging to a group) the greater will be the
self-consistency sacrifice one will be willing to accept to enter the group
• The greater is β, the less one will accept to be in discrepancy to enter the group.
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Intuitively, we represent an individual who has to choose an identity action, to satisfy
his own consistency, and his social aspiration. If the value he gives to his own self-
consistency is way higher than the one he gives to the social identity he gets, he will not
accept to make the effort to enter the group unless the boundary of the group is close
to his inner choice, hence Xc − d is close to X0. Conversely, an individual who is very
worried of his social integration (high value on group membership, high α) might suffer
a high discrepancy.
2.1.2 Discrimination for a normal outsider
We take once angain : D 6= 0.
α− β(Xc − d−X0) ≥ DW (13)
Here the monetary cost of being in the group, DW , as to be overdriven by the net
psychological lift of being integrated : α− β(Xc− d−X0), which is the value of being in
the group net of the psychological cost engaged by an individual to show his closeness to
the group, at the expense of his psychological consistency.
2.2 The insider equilibria
We compute intuitively various equilibria for insiders, i.e. individuals whose inner identity
is ”close to the group identity standard”. (⇔ X0 ∈ [Xc − d;Xc]). To assess the choice of
the individual, we compare (10) et (7)
2.2.1 No discrimination and classical insider
We male an additionnal assumption :
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• D = 0
So we have to compare W˜ − β(Xc− d−X0) and W˜ + α. Doing so, we find trivially that
in absence of discrimination, an individual chooses to opt in a group if α > 0. No further
comments need to be done on this point.
2.2.2 Discrimination with a perfect insider
We make an additional assumption :
• We call a perfect insider an individual whose choice would be the exact choice of
the group, that is to say :X0 = Xc.
So we need to compare W˜ − βd and (1−D)W˜ + α. This yields the following condition








Which is equivalent to :
α︸︷︷︸
gains of entering the group
+ βd︸︷︷︸
consistency gain of entering the group
≥ DW˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
monetary loss of entering the group
(15)
Which needs not be always verified. This means that even an invidual perfectly fitting
in the group ideals can choose to stand at some distance to the group if this groups
suffers from too important a discrimination. This is a first possible strategy that one
can pursue when categorized as belonging to a stereotyped-against group. Intuitivly this
would happen if the willigness to match own norms is not to high, that is when one
doesn’t feel much commited to his own norms. Or when the group value is nothing
compared to the cost of discrimination, the loss of wage being more stringent than the
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gain one can pull from the group. In this simple frame, thus, the individual may not act
against discrimination by prooving that the members of his group are ”better” than what
the principal thinks. This could need further development.
2.3 Welfare outcomes with discrimination
The introduction of discrimination in this simple framework is detrimental to individuals
welfare, and this whatever the choice related to group, at the end. Results commented
now are reported in table 2 for an outsider and table 3 for an insider
INITIAL SITUATION
IN OUT
Ends-up IN DW not consistent
Ends-up OUT α − β(X0 − (Xc − d))
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Table 2: Utility loss of introducing discrimination for an outsider
INITIAL SITUATION
IN OUT
Ends-up IN DW not consistent
Ends-up OUT α+ β(X0 − (Xc − d)) not consistent
Table 3: Utility loss of introducing discrimination for an insider
For the normal outsider, if the discrimination is not to high, relative to group val-
uation, the individual chooses to stay in the group, and looses DW for a D level of
discrimination. Conversely, an individual may choose to fly away from the group when
it becomes discriminated. This would arise with a high discrimination combinated with
a relatively high need for consistency. This does not rule out the downside effect of dis-
crimination on individual : the choice of staying out of the group is not a first best choice,
but rather a constrained choice, due to discrimination. This case arises when D becomes
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high enough to overide psychological and social benefits of group membership.
For the normal insider, the idea is the same, when introducing discrimination, any
insider would suffer either a monetary loss of DW if he decides to stay in the group.
But this time the non-monetary loss, for an individual who decides to fly axay from the
group, will include the social dimension loss, and the psychological discrepancy loss.
This straightaway way of putting things helps fix the idea that not only directly dis-
criminated individuals suffer from discrimination, nut as well people who are categorized
with a discriminated group and have to incur a cost to stay at some distance from this
group. An exemple is that a woman who reaches top responsabilities at odds with the
stereotypes has not managed to avoid discrimination but rather suffers an additional cost
relative to her male competitors, to prove the stereotypes weighting on women may not
be extended to her. This in line directly with the fact that, for an individual, the social
categorization is partly undergone as opposed to choosen.
2.4 Possible scenarios when the tolerance of the group varies
The aim here is to assess the effect of variation of ”d” wich captures the tolerance of the




In the group Out of the group Out of the group In the group
∆+ d Rise in welfare for
the individual : he
can stay in the group
meanwhile choosing
an X closer to his X0 :
he needs less sacrifice
to get in the group +
Either no effect if the
psychological cost is
still to high to enter
the group, or a pos-
itive effect through a
reduction of psycho-
logical welfare over-
driven by the welfare
due to integration in a
group null or −
No effect : the individ-
ual needs not deviat-
ing from X0 null
Negative effect : to
stay out of the group
and avoid discrimina-
tion, ones is obliged
to choose an X even
more remote from his
X0. For individuals
whose group value α
is higher, he can en-
ter the group, but suf-
fering from discrimi-
nation −
∆− d Negative effect : ei-
ther the individual has
to bear a cost in terms
of β(X − X0) to stay
in the group, or he be-
comes excluded from
the group, at the ex-
pense of the utility re-
lated to group mem-
bership −
No effect : the individ-
ual needs not deviat-
ing from X0 null
If the individual stays
an insider, no ef-
fect (individual in the
very close neighboor-
hood of X0, but if he
becomes an outsider,
he suffers either from
psychological discrep-
ancy (β(X − X0)), or
from social loss (α)
null or −
Positive : if the in-
dividuals becomes
an outsider, he can
choose X = X0, and
if he stays an insider,
he’ll choose a X that’s
closer from X0 +
3 Insights into a more flexible model
We keep the same overall structure of the model, but this time, we specify a more complex
behavior of the group and assume that the principal as well has inner norms, that impacts
his discriminatory behavior. The aim is not to find an equilibrium, but to give some
insights of the additional results such a decision rule would give. The situation is best
depicted in 4igure 4 . In the first place, we consider that the principal, and the group,
have totaly oppositional norms, which implies that they can be depicted in the two edge
of identity axis. . We further put that Xc = X0 = 0.




γj +NW (1−D(Xc)) + τ(Xc) (16)
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Figure 4: The situation
(16) gives the utility of the group, when the individual is not accepted in. γj is the
personnal qualities an individual j is endowed with. NW (1 − D(Xc)) is the monetary
component of the utility, τ(Xc) the identity related utility.
When the group accepts an extra individual, it modifies its identity which repercutes
on discrimination and purely identity related satisfaction : Xc becomes Xc(X) where X
stands for the choice of the individual.
So, integrating the extra individual, the utility of the members of the group becomes
defined by the new norm Xc(X). Nevertheless, the acceptance rule is defined by the
welfare implication of acceptance, but only for the members that are already in the
group. To some extent, they ”vote” to accept in an individual, and the opinion of this
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individual on wether he should be accepted is no taken into account17. So the rule is that
the individual is accepted if and only if the additionnal welfare for the (n prior) members






j γj + γi + (1−D(Xc(X))WN − τ(Xc(X)) ≥
∑n
j γj + (1−D(Xc))WN − τ(Xc)
O otherwise
(17)
Before accepting an individual, we can assume that
∑n
i γi = 0 which is not of great
importance : it will have no impact on the choice of accepting an individual. Moreover,
we assume that τ(Xc) = 0 since the agreement between the member becomes the new
norm, and the cost of accepting an individual is the cost of changing identity norm. The
cost can be thought of as only temporary, and transitionnary. In fact, the identity cost





1 if γi + (D(Xc)−D(Xc(X))NW > τ(Xc(X))
O otherwise
(18)
The equation (18) displays clearly the cost / benefit analysis conducted by the group :
the cost of accepting the individual i is on the right part, and is the cost of identity losse,
and the benefits are on the left part, accounting for monetary benefits, and personnal
qualities benefits. To this point, we see that the group would agree to accept in an
individual that is further from his norm if this one provides higher personal qualities.
Intuitivly, an individual provided with attractive qualities might have to do more to self
exclude from a group that he doesn’t want to be assimilated to.
17It’s here again an assumption, but that is acceptable if we think that the individual would vote
strategically
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The principal has a more flexible behavior since the discrimination D becomes a function
depending on its inner normXp, the norm of the groupXc that eventually depends onX if
the individual is accepted in. If we consider an axis such as : figure 4 we can assume that







D′(Xc) > 0. Definig the rule for discrimination
in this maneer is not neutral. We formerly indicates that the identity choices are not
linked with moral or productivity issues. That means that the principal discriminates
individuals that that part into a group that is far from his own norms because he prefers
working with people who share more similarities with him, for instance for at work ”well-
being” issues.
In this setup, to gather outcomes of the model, we define as in the former part ”insiders”.
3.1 Outcomes for a perfect insider
As said before, an insider is an individual whose inner norm is perfectly matching the
one of the group is linked to : Xc = X0. He has to choose which identity action to take,
within the axis [Xc;Xp]. This choice will take him either to be accepted in the group,
or to be kept out of the group. When the individual is out of the group, he chooses X˜
which is the level that brings him a maximum utility provided that he is standing aside
of the group. Straightforwardly :
X˜ such as U(X˜) = 0 (19)
Choosing any other X that make him outside of the group would harm him even more
in terms of identity, since he’ll have to get further from X0, having no additional gain in
terms of discrimination since discrimination are group related
On the other hand, if the individual wants to opt in the group, he chooses X = X⋆ such
36





st U(X) ≥ 0
(20)
We suppose that there exists a X⋆ that maximises equation 20, such as X⋆ < X˜, which
means that, du to the carecteristics of both the group and the individual, the optimal
choice should lead to be accepted in the group.







Getting a step further from the inner norm will cost more to the psychological comfort
than the lower monetary discrimination could compensate. Indeed, on the left part is
displayed the marginal cost that must not exceed what he gathers from his impact on
discrimination. The strongest the need for psychological consistency, the lower will be
the effort to change the identity group, all things being held equals. Equation 21 also
accounts for the sensitivness of the principal to the group’s norm through ∂D(X)
∂X
. And
for the impact of the individual on the norm of the group, through ∂X
∂Xc
. This might lead
us to extent or model to leadership related issues in further work.
Conclusion
The idea of the previous was to think about the reaction of the discriminated against the
discrimination he undergoes. We took the perspectives of social identities, and personal
consistency has leverage against discrimination. This led us to built a simple model that
posits that, if discrimination can be escaped from, it would probably be not only at the
expense of social situation, but also of one’s inner aspiration. In this sense, discriminated
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would manage there identity by squirming to fit the discriminator’s views. Although
not totally new, we believe that the reaction of the discriminated have been widely ig-
nored, limiting it’s role in the economic analysis of discrimination. We also think that it
could be fruitfull to enter in many more details, to get a first understanding of this ques-
tion, and to be able to picture the phenomenon of discrimination in a more complete way.
Indeed, we’ve so far focused on a set of possible answers that a discriminated can
lead to fight discriminations. They are related to the management of identity, how this is
tinkered to get better off. That’s why we formerly mentionned identity management, as a
answer to discrimination. But one can think of other answers that can be given to discrim-
ination. It wouldn’t be absurd that discrimination has an impact on the discriminated
willingness to work, and productivity. That is to say that under certain circumstances,
instead or cumulativly with the identity management, a discriminated person will set his
level of effort to change the principal mind or at least to compensate. This would go in
a new direction as regard to the theory of fairness.
In this set of alternative way of thinking to our question, another is worth noting. In
a more psychological orientation, individuals are considered to assimilated with groups.
But the real emphasize might be on the group they filled associated with. Put differently,
this would imply that it’s not the signaling value of the identity choice that matters
that much, but the personnal feeling toward groups. For instance, an individual who is
victim of discrimination can ”chose” to compare only to most discriminated, rather than
privileged ones to lower his bad feelings about that. Discrimination would lead to less
stringent reaction, although would impact the psychology of the discriminated.
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A Sum-up table of the baseline model
choice of the individual utility example
Insider in group X0 (1−D)W˜ + α Discrimination are not high enough to
overcome the benefits to be in the
group. He feels close to the group, and
accepts being discriminated for that.
outgroup (Xc − d)
− W˜ − β(Xc − d−X0) Here, the discriminations are too high.
The individual doesn’t which to stay in
the group, so he advisedly decides to
set apart from the group.
Outsider ingroup (Xc − d)
+ (1−D)W˜ + α− β(Xc − d−X0) The outsider in the group denots of
a concern about integration that over-
comes the psychological and monetary
costs of getting in the group.
Outgroup X0 W˜ This could denot either a high level of
discrimination, or a willingness to stay
alone, and follow proper way.
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